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Aristodemus was only half awake, and he did not hear the beginning of the discourse; the 
chief thing which he remembered was Socrates compelling the other two to acknowledge 
that the genius of comedy was the same with that of tragedy, and that the true artist in 
tragedy was an artist in comedy also. 
Plato, Symposium1 
 
Is classical tragedy contingent upon a Greco-Roman sense of morality? Or can tragedy exist 
within a Judeo-Christian universe as well? Literary critic Northrop Frye’s theory of high-mimetic 
tragedy inherits distinctions that Aristotle draws between tragedy and comedy in the Poetics. As a 
brief philological excursion will demonstrate, the binary distinctions upon which Aristotle builds 
his tragic structure are inherently entangled with notions of a noble aristocracy, what Friedrich 
Nietzsche would call a master morality. With the introduction of Judeo-Christian morality— a 
framework that inverts the master morality latent in Aristotle’s system— the tragic structure 
breaks down. As demonstrated in King Lear, when these two antithetical notions of morality are 
present within the same text, the binary oppositions that underlie the tragic structure collapse, 
undermining the genre distinctions that separate tragedy from comedy.   
Northrop Frye, in his Anatomy of Criticism, introduces his theory of modes by recalling a 
passage in the Poetics in which Aristotle uses a character’s elevation relative to the audience as 
criteria for distinguishing between types of poetry. The passage Frye seems to be recalling is as 
follows:  
…since those who imitate choose as objects of imitation men in action and since 
those in action must be either good [spoudaios] or bad [phaulos] characters 
(inasmuch as character almost always falls into one of these two categories owing 
to the fact that distinctions in human character are all derived from the distinction 
between badness and goodness), they portray them as either better, or worse, or such 
as we are. 2  
As Frye keenly notes, translating the spoudaios as “good” and phaulos as “bad” seems “to indicate a 
somewhat narrowly moralistic view of literature.”3 Frye softens the moral implications of the 
translation by expanding the terms to figuratively signify weighty and light action. He then 
moves into an explication of his modal system, never returning to the spoudaios/phaulos 
opposition or to the curious issue of translation-imposed morality.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Plato, Symposium, 223d.  
2 Aristotle, Poetics, 1448a, (emphasis mine). 
3 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957), 33. 
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Binary Opposition in the Poetics 
While translating the spoudaios/phaulos binary as weighty/light may be sufficient for Frye’s 
purposes of distinguishing between the high and low mimetic and preserving Aristotle’s 
distinction between tragedy and comedy, this binary is central to Aristotle’s Poetics and deserves a 
more nuanced reading. Shortly after the passage Frye cites, Aristotle repeats his distinction 
between types of poetry, now with the labels tragedy and comedy: 
It is this difference in portrayal of character which distinguishes tragedy from 
comedy; for comedy strives to portray men as a worse and tragedy as better than 
men now are.4    
However, instead of again using spoudaios and phaulos for worse and better, Aristotle associates 
tragedy with agathos (ἀγαθός) and comedy with kakos (κακός).5 While agathos/kakos oppose each 
other sufficiently to allow for effortless substitution with spoudaios/phaulos, the words expand the 
dualities latent in tragedy and comedy beyond weighty vs. light. Agathos6 is most often translated 
as noble, in reference to birth, with associations of wealth and power, and in direct opposition to 
kakos. Kakos7 does not have a positive definition, and instead is best understood as the negation of 
agathos: as ignoble, cowardly, and poor. While Frye does not account for this expansion of 
meaning, it is necessary to place noble/ignoble alongside weighty/light and good/bad as the 
antithetical aspects of tragedy and comedy.  
When recalling the history and development of poetry, Aristotle adds another 
connotation to the tragedy-comedy dichotomy by casting “cheap” as the antonym of “noble”:   
The next step was a gradual division of poetry according to the inherent 
characters of the poets. The nobler poets portrayed noble deeds and deeds of noble 
individuals, while the cheaper ones portrayed the deeds of cheap persons…And so, 
when tragedy and comedy came into being, poets turned to one or the other of 
these, each according as his particular type of character urged him…8 
By repeating the substitution procedure, this time associating comedy with the word eutelés 
(ευτελής), Aristotle adds a notion of value to comedy and tragedy. Eutelés9, in a non-figurative 
sense, is translated as cheap and easily paid for. When applied to persons it is can mean 
worthlessness. This dichotomy of wealth is not accurately represented in our previous list of 
dualities. Thus, along with good/bad, weighty/light, and noble/ignoble, we must add 
noble/cheap to the antithetical characteristics of comedy and tragedy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Aristotle, Poetics, 1448a.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, revised by Sir Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick 
McKenzie (Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1940), “ἀγαθός.” Perseus Digital Library < http://www.perseus.tufts.edu> 
7 Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, “κακός.” 
8 Aristotle, Poetics, 1448b, (emphasis mine). 
9 Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, “ευτελής.” 
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Aristotle’s technique of maintaining rigid binary opposition between tragedy and comedy 
while layering on opposing characteristics creates a rich and nuanced distinction between these 
two types of poetry. By incorporating notions of nobility and wealth/value into this distinction, 
Aristotle makes the concepts of tragedy and comedy inseparable from a hierarchical aristocracy. 
For the “weightiness” of tragedy— the distinction of the characters being “better” than the 
audience— is entangled with notions of rank, class, and social position. Recast in Nietzschean 
terms, one might say that Aristotle builds his judgments of good, bad, better, and worse upon 
the framework of a master morality: 
What pointed me in the right direction was…what the designations of 
‘good’…meant from an etymological perspective. I found that they all led back to 
the same transformation of concepts—that ‘refined’ or ‘noble’ in the sense of social 
standing is everywhere the fundamental concept, from which ‘good’ in the sense 
of ‘having a refined soul’ necessarily developed. This development always ran 
parallel with that other one by means of which ‘common’ or ‘plebian’ or ‘low’ 
ultimately slide over into the concept of ‘bad’…10 
Nietzsche goes on to show— as Aristotle’s substitutions demonstrate— that agathos and kakos, 
used as good and bad, are inseparable from notions of nobility and commonness.11  
Nietzsche places Judeo-Christian morality—which he refers to as slave morality—in 
opposition to the master morality of the Greco-Roman world. For Nietzsche, Judeo-Christian 
morality is founded upon alterity and resentment. Whereas master morality is value creating, slave 
morality simply inverts the values of master morality, casting the noble as bad and the common as 
good. “[Slave morality] requires an outside stimulus in order to act at all; all its action is reaction. 
The opposite is true of aristocratic valuations: such values grow and act spontaneously, seeking 
out their contraries only in order to affirm themselves even more gratefully and delightedly.”12 
Read in light of Nietzsche’s master morality, Aristotle avoids the moralizing that Frye 
attempted to soften. For, as Aristotle uses it, “better” means closer to nobility, while “worse” 
means closer to the common people. The “fall” which occurs in tragedy is a fall from nobility, 
from greatness, and has no connotations of the Edenic fall of Judeo-Christian morality. Tragedy 
occurs because of an action a character commits: not a “bad” action or an action undertaken by a 
“bad” character in the Christian sense of morality, but an action in which the consequences were 
not foreseen by the character. As Aristotle notes, if actions were independent from the 
constitution of a character, tragedy would still be successful: “Moreover, without action there 
could be no tragedy, but there could be tragedy without character.”13 Thus, it follows that tragedy 
is not a form based upon moralized judgments of character, but rather, the playing out of the 
consequences of action independent of ethos.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morals: a Polemic : by Way of Clarification and Supplement to My 
Last Book, Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Douglas Smith. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), 14. 
11 Ibid., 16.  
12 Ibid., 22.  
13 Aristotle, Poetics, 1450a.  
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Frye’s Aristotelian Inheritance 
Northrop Frye builds his theory of modes upon an Aristotelian framework, inheriting the 
nuanced binaries of the Poetics. Adopting Aristotle’s distinctions between tragedy and comedy, 
Frye distinguishes between tragic fictional modes and comic fictional modes. He also utilizes 
Aristotle’s distinction between “better than us” and “worse than us” to identify between the high 
and low mimetic in both the tragic and the comic:  
If superior in degree to other men but not to his natural environment, the hero is 
a leader. He has authority, passions, and powers of expression far greater than 
ours…This is the hero of the high mimetic mode, of most epic and tragedy, and is 
primarily the kind of hero Aristotle had in mind.14  
The three characteristics that Frye lists to demarcate a high mimetic hero—authority, passion, 
and power of expression—are worth closer examination. With these terms, and his designation 
of the high mimetic hero as a leader, Frye attempts to abstract the characteristics of nobility 
while effacing the necessity of an aristocratic social structure. “Authority” is a clever substitution 
for “nobility,” carrying on the sense of power, influence, and supremacy inherent to a noble class 
while leaving behind notions of an external social hierarchy. The term “authority” grants 
influence on the basis of character and merit, while “nobility” grants influence on the basis of 
bloodline and social position. “Passion” and “power of expression” accomplish similar 
substitutions, relocating the tragic hero’s locus of privilege from an external order to an internal 
quality. Whereas Aristotle’s tragic hero was elevated in the sense that he was hierarchically above 
others in status and custom, Frye’s high mimetic hero is elevated because of the relative force of 
his passions and potency of expression.  
Frye’s expansion of the sense of a tragic hero is both a redoubling of and a rupture from 
Aristotle’s conception. While Frye does acknowledge that tragedy has only occurred during 
periods “of social history in which an aristocracy is fast losing its effective power but still retains a 
good deal of ideological prestige,” he notes this as historical categorization rather than structural 
necessity.15 Frye breaks from Aristotle by making the qualities and psychological makeup of a 
character inseparable from the tragedy of plot. In Frye’s model, tragedy cannot exist without 
character, as it can for Aristotle, for the hierarchical elevation which makes a tragic fall possible is 
held internal to the character’s “ideological prestige.” In a sense, Frye is expanding the structure 
of tragedy to accommodate both Elizabethan and Athenian forms of tragedy.16 And yet, Frye 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 34.  
15 Ibid., 37.  
16 “…in Elizabethan tragedy and specifically in Shakespeare, the hero’s character is depicted in greater and more 
varied detail than in antique tragedy, and participates more actively in shaping the individual’s fate. But it is also 
possible to describe the difference in another way: one might say that the idea of destiny in Elizabethan tragedy is 
both more broadly conceived and more closely linked to the individual character than it is in antique tragedy. In the 
latter, fate means nothing but the given tragic complex, the present network of events in which a particular person is 
enmeshed at a particular moment. …The essence of his personality is revealed and evolves exclusively within the 
particular tragic action; everything else is omitted. All this is based upon the way in which antique drama arose and 
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remains true to Aristotle in the sense that he adheres to a master morality and does not introduce 
moralizing judgments of “good” and “bad”— in the Judeo-Christian sense— into his tragic 
system:  
The particular thing called tragedy that happens to the tragic hero does not 
depend on his moral status. If it is causally related to something he has done, as it 
generally is, the tragedy is in the inevitability of the consequences of the act, not 
in its moral significance as an act…Aristotle’s hamartia or “flaw,” therefore, is not 
necessarily wrongdoing, much less moral weakness...17  
Thus, while Frye expands the agency and privilege of character in relation to action and attempts 
to soften the aristocratic structure essential to tragedy, he preserves the Aristotelian binaries 
within his notion of the high and low mimetic: noble/ignoble (leader/non-leader), weighty/light 
(sublime passion / common emotional faculty), and noble/cheap (high rhetorical skills / poor 
expression).  
 
The Collapse of Aristotelian Binaries in King Lear 
While Frye’s Aristotelian distinctions of the high-mimetic tragic style adequately model literary 
universes based upon a master morality, the distinctions collapse when facing paradigmatic shifts 
and the advent of Christian morality. This tension, between master morality and slave morality, is 
especially visible in King Lear in which an explicit Christian morality is noticeably absent. The 
universe of King Lear is inherently unstable: characters rapidly rise and fall in social elevation, 
familial relations decay and turn poisonous overnight, and the distinctions between reason and 
madness become increasingly blurred. At the center of this chaos, both structurally and 
chronologically, is the storm scene.  
Read through the lens of master morality, Lear enters the storm scene as a tragic, falling 
king— a remnant of a collapsing aristocracy— lapses in and out of madness, and hits bottom— 
can fall no more— with the following line: “Unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, 
bare, forked animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings: come, unbutton here.”18 While Lear 
remains “great” in the Aristotelian sense— for fallen nobility is not equivalent to an ignoble 
commoner—and “superior in degree” in Frye’s sense—for the passion expressed in his madness 
and his mastery of language are unparalleled— Lear has fallen as far as possible from the position 
of king: mad and near naked, Lear has lost his kingdom, his knights, and his sovereignty. 
And yet, read through the lens of Christian morality, the storm scene constitutes the 
beginning of Lear’s salvation. Within this moral system, Lear, as an almost-naked, suffering 
outcast is now closer to the Christian king of kings than he has ever previously been. As if 
echoing this sentiment, Lear falls on his knees in a most out of character prayer. Praying for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on its technical requirements.” Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: the Representation of Reality in Western Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1953), 319.  
17 Ibid., 38.  
18 William Shakespeare, King Lear, ed. R. A. Foakes, The Arden Shakespeare (London: Thomson Learning, 2006), 
3.4.105-7. 
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“poor naked wretches” of the world, identifying with the meek, “unfed,” and “houseless,” Lear, in 
an apparent moment of clarity, recognizes the ubiquity of suffering which he had previously been 
blind to.  He wishes to “shake the superflux to them,” that is, distribute wealth to the poor and 
“show the heavens more just.”19 The notion of justice that Lear appeals to is not aligned with 
“noble” and “good” in the Aristotelian sense; that is, it is not an appeal to a master morality. 
Rather, it is an appeal to the “good” within a Christian morality, an appeal to the theological 
notion of caritas, and echoes New Testament passages such as Matthew 19:21.20 Thus, into the 
tragic framework constituted upon an aristocratic hierarchy, enters a new sense of morality— a 
Christian sense of morality—that inverts the Aristotelian master morality: the poor, powerless, 
and meek have become the good.21  
Emerging from the storm scene, there is a sense of a shift in the structure of morality in 
the universe of King Lear. The moral ambiguity— in the Christian sense— that filled the pre-
storm sections of the play is gone and characters are either wholly good or terrifyingly evil. As 
Frye aptly notes: “…from then on we have something unique in Shakespeare: a dramatic world 
in which the characters are, like chess pieces, definitely black or white.”22 This is exemplified in 
the scene of Gloucester’s blinding. Having servants bind Gloucester to a chair, Cornwall 
proceeds to put out one of Gloucester’s eyes with his foot. Suddenly, Cornwall’s servant 
intervenes with the following justification: 
Hold your hand, my lord. 
I have served you ever since I was a child, 
But better service have I never done you 
Than now to bid you hold.23  
The servant intervenes because he morally objects to the behavior of his master. If the universe of 
King Lear were still operating within a paradigm of master morality, the behavior of Cornwall, 
the noble, would be aligned with the good by default, as long as he was acting in the spirit of 
nobility. However, the servant’s objection does not seem to be an implication that Cornwall is 
acting in the spirit of a commoner rather than a nobleman. After all, as far as the servant knows, 
Gloucester really is a traitor. Instead, the servant seems to be objecting to the wrongness, the evil 
nature, of the violence committed against Gloucester. This sense of right/wrong (good/evil) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Shakespeare, King Lear, 3.4.27-36. 
20 “Jesus said unto him, If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have 
treasure in heaven: and come and follow me.” Mathew 19:21, KJV. 
21 Frye offers insightful commentary on this scene, but does not seem able—or willing—to label Lear’s 
transformation as Christian: “What is happening is that he has lost his identity as a king in the body peculiar to a 
king, but is beginning to recover his royal nature in his other body, his individual and physical one; not just the body 
that is cold and wet, but the mind that realizes how many others are cold and wet, starting with the Fool and Poor 
Tom. To use religious terms, his relation to his kingdom was transcendent at the beginning of the play; now it is 
immanent. Whatever his actual size, Lear is a giant figure, but his gigantic dimensions are now not those of a king 
or hero; they are those of a human being who suffers but understands his affinity with others who suffer.” Northrop 
Frye, “King Lear,” in Northrop Frye on Shakespeare, ed. Robert Sandler (New Haven: Yale UP, 1986), 116. 
22 Frye, “King Lear,” 104.  
23 Shakespeare, King Lear, 3.7.69-73. 
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independent of notions of nobility and aristocracy is indicative of a Christian moral framework; 
and who more fitting to act nobly—in the Christian sense of noble—than the lowest, least 
powerful, and most common character in the scene. It is this sense of wrongness that makes 
Gloucester’s blinding so universally unstomachable: he is subject to a violence that, as A.C 
Bradley notes, threatens to overpower and transcend the emotions—fear and pity— upon which 
the very structure of tragedy depends.24 
This advent of a Christian morality begins to undermine the Aristotelian binaries upon 
which the tragic structure of King Lear depends. Because of the latent clash between the master 
morality of the Greco-tragic form and the Christian morality that inverts this form, King Lear 
fails—refuses—to reconcile as either a tragedy— in the sense of Aristotle and Frye—or a 
Christian comedy, in the sense of being a story of salvation. This collapse of the binary 
distinctions undermining the tragic form is best demonstrated in the scene of Cordelia’s death. If 
read within a tragic framework Cordelia’s death is not the death of a tragic, high-mimetic 
character. While “superior in degree”25 to others in the Aristotelian sense, unless the act which 
engenders the “inevitability of consequences”26 is traced back to her early utterance of “Nothing, 
my lord,”27 Cordelia’s death is not a tragic consequence of some hamartia28. Even if one was 
inclined to associate Cordelia’s death with her refusal to praise her father in the opening scene, 
Cordelia exhibits no anagnorisis29 or catharsis30: her death is off stage, she is absent from the 
majority of the play, and she has no recognition that she is going to die or that an unforeseen 
consequence of an action leads to her death.  
For Cordelia’s death to be related to the tragic structure of King Lear her death must be a 
consequence of Lear’s actions. Cordelia gestures towards this interpretation close to the death 
scene: “We are not the first / Who with best meaning have incurred the worse. For thee, 
oppressed King, I am cast down.”31 Technically, Lear’s treatment of Cordelia in the opening 
scene did, causally, engender the events that led to Cordelia’s imprisonment and death. 
Furthermore, Lear has a moment of anagnorisis in which he realizes the consequences of his 
actions towards Cordelia: “If you have poison for me, I will drink it. / I know you do not love 
me, for your sisters / Have, as I do remember, do me wrong. You have some cause, they have 
not.”32 And yet, Lear is forgiven by Cordelia: “No cause, no cause.”33 Furthermore, he lucidly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 A.C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth, 2nd ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1905), 251.  
25 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 33.  
26 Ibid., 38.  
27 Shakespeare, King Lear, 1.1.87. 
28 Tragic Flaw. See Aristotle, Poetics, 1453A9-10. 
29 Recognition. Aristotle defines anagnorisis as “a change from ignorance to knowledge, producing love or hate 
between the persons destined by the poet for good or bad fortune." See Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a30–32. 
30 A difficult to translate word that means emotional purgation or climactic feeling of pity and sorrow. See Aristotle, 
Poetics, 1449b21-28. 
31 Shakespeare, King Lear, 5.3.3-5 
32 Ibid.,4.7.72-6 
33 Ibid., 4.7.77 
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reconciles with her: “When thou dost ask me blessing I’ll kneel down / And ask of thee 
forgiveness.”34 It is precisely at this moment of reconciliation that Lear and Cordelia are 
imprisoned, and shortly after, Cordelia is murdered. The reconciliation between Lear and 
Cordelia diffuses any emotional inertia that could have led to catharsis. Within this context, 
Cordelia’s death— a hanging arranged by Edmund— does not register as the tragic inevitability 
of an action undertaken in ignorance, rather, her death registers as unnecessary and unwarranted 
murder.  
If read within a Christian framework, Cordelia’s death must be intertwined with a sense 
of salvation. As an innocent, dutiful35, and forgiving daughter, Cordelia is exquisitely “good” in 
the Christian sense of the word. And yet, her death is not tragic, for her death is not the end. 
Rather than dying meaninglessly and pointlessly, Cordelia nobly transcends into the kingdom of 
heaven and continues to live: “[the advent of Christianity implies] a transposition of the center of 
gravity from life on earth into a life beyond, with the result that no tragedy ever reached its 
conclusion here below.”36 Cordelia’s death is not an ending, but the beginning of an assumption 
into heaven; thus, King Lear qualifies as a mythical Christian comedy in Frye’s system: “The 
mythical comedy…is Apollonian, the story of how a hero is accepted by a society of gods…in 
Christian literature it is the theme of salvation, or, in a more concentrated form, of 
assumption.”37 And yet, the violence of the death of Gloucester, the promptness and cruelty of 
Cordelia’s death, and the questionable moral outcome at the end of the play, all undermine a 
Christian reading of King Lear: “Christianity has prompt and confident answers, but the more 
emotionally convincing the tragedy, the more we may feel that the answers sometimes are a bit 
too pat.”38 Thus, the two moral systems present within King Lear mutually undermine and bleed 
into each other, making a choice between either reading of the text impossible.  
Built upon the chaotic structure of two opposing moralities—the master morality and the 
Judeo-Christian slave morality—King Lear simultaneously contains two antithetical notions of 
“good,” “bad,” “noble,” and “common.” For what is great in the sense of classical nobility is 
resented in Christianity, and what is ignoble and common is revered: 
That the King of Kings was treated as a low criminal, that he was mocked, spat 
upon, whipped, and nailed to the cross—that story no sooner comes to dominate 
the consciousness of the people than it completely destroys the aesthetics of the 
separation of styles…a new sermo humilis is born, a low style, such as would 
properly only be applicable to comedy, but which now reaches out far beyond its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34Shakespeare, King Lear, 5.3.10-11 
35 I am thankful for a footnote in my Arden edition of King Lear pointing out the similarity between Cordelia’s “O 
dear father, It is thy business that I go about (4.4.23-4)” and Christ’s “I must go about my father’s business (Luke 
2:49, KJV).”    
36 Auerbach, Mimesis, 317.  
37 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 43.  
38 Frye, “King Lear,” 102.  
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original domain, and encroaches upon the deepest and the highest, the sublime 
and the eternal.39  
Since the Aristotelian distinctions that form the basis of tragedy are contingent upon aristocratic 
notions of morality, when two opposing notions of morality are present within a text, the binary 
oppositions that underlie the tragic structure collapse. King Lear is neither tragedy nor comedy, 
and in some senses it is both: the richness and depth created by its intersecting, antithetical 
frameworks of morality overwhelm genre distinctions. Thus, while Aristotle’s— and by 
inheritance— Frye’s distinction of the tragic are useful for categorizing tropes, aspects, and 
structural plot elements of literature, great works like King Lear— which contain conflicting and 
unstable moral frameworks— overwhelm, collapse, and transcend distinctions of the tragic. For 
great works, like Lear himself, sit within the center of a storm of meaning: too large to play 
within a role, too complex to neatly fit within the structure of a mode, forever overflowing and 
transcending distinctions, with sublimity seeping through all seams.  
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